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FROM EN VENTRE SA MERE TO THAWING AN HEIR: POSTHUMOUSLY  
CONCEIVED CHILDREN AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SUCCESSION LAW  
IN CANADA 
Christine E. Doucet* 
[R]eproductive technologies will grow and advance, and as they 
do, the number of children they will produce will continue to mul-
tiply. So, too, will the complex moral, legal, social, and ethical 
questions that surround their birth.1 
 
Posthumously conceived children may not come into the world the 
way the majority of children do. But they are children nonetheless.2 
 
I. Introduction 
The rapid and continued advancements in assisted reproductive technology 
now make it possible for children to be both conceived and born after the death of 
a genetic parent. The use of assisted reproduction is increasing across Canada3; in 
2009, there were 16,315 in vitro procedures performed in Canada, resulting in 
5,710 live births.4 This figure represents only one form of assisted reproductive 
technology, and does not include the numerous children born as a result of artifi-
cial insemination.5 The increase in use of procedures such as in vitro fertilization 
may be a result of numerous factors, including families choosing to have children 
                                                                                                                                                         
* Christine E. Doucet received her J.D. from Osgoode Hall Law School in 2012. She also holds a B.S.W. 
from York University and a B.A. in media studies from the University of Western Ontario. The views 
expressed in this article are solely those of the author. 
 
1 Eng Khabbaz v Commissioner, Soc Sec Administration, 155 NH 798; 930 A 2d 1180 at 1186 (Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire, 2007).  
2 Woodward v Comm’r of Soc Sec, 760 NE 2d 257 at 266 (Mass Sup Jud Ct 2002) [Woodward]. 
3 Alberta Law Reform Institute, Succession and Posthumously Conceived Children: Report for Discussion 
(Edmonton: Alberta Law Reform Institute, 2012) at 4.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid. As the Report indicates: “[W]ith respect to artificial insemination, it is difficult to estimate how 
often the procedure is performed due to the lack of reporting requirements.” 
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later in life, a decrease in the number of children available for adoption, and the 
decreasing cost of treatments and procedures.6  
Succession legislation across the country recognizes there may be situations in 
which a child is conceived before, but born after, the death of one parent. Children 
who are en ventre sa mere at the time of their parent’s death are granted succession 
rights, including the right to inherit on intestacy.7 Most legislation, however, is 
silent when it comes to posthumously conceived children. Many of the legislative 
schemes governing intestate succession were enacted before the development of 
assisted reproductive technology, and the legislatures perhaps did not contemplate 
these developments and the implications these advancements can have on succes-
sion law. As technology continues to advance, these implications, including the 
rights of posthumously conceived children to inherit on intestacy, warrant consid-
eration. The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications of posthumous 
conception on estate litigation and succession law in Canada, as well as identify 
and explore possible ways of addressing this emerging issue. Any consideration, 
however, requires a balanced approach. By examining the ways in which other ju-
risdictions have addressed this issue, this paper will outline possibilities and 
considerations for reform. 
While there are many implications arising from the use of assisted reproductive 
technology on estate litigation, the scope of this paper is limited to an examination 
of the succession rights of posthumously conceived children to inherit on intestacy. 
Part II of this paper will outline the competing interests and policy considerations 
that need to be balanced in situations involving posthumously conceived children. 
Part III will provide an overview of the current law and legislative context in Cana-
da. It will examine the federal Assisted Human Reproduction Act, provincial 
legislation, and reform efforts from jurisdictions across the country. Part IV will 
offer international perspectives by examining case law, legislation, and law reform 
efforts from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Part V will look 
at possible legislative reforms to protect posthumously conceived children and 
their right to inherit on intestacy. Alternatively, the courts may establish rights for 
posthumously conceived children. Part VI will examine the use of the parens patri-
ae jurisdiction and how this inherent jurisdiction of the superior courts can be used 
to address the issues. Finally, Part VII will offer conclusions and recommendations 
to protect posthumously conceived children and their rights to inherit on intestacy. 
II. Competing Interests and Policy Considerations 
There are many circumstances in which individuals may want to procreate after 
the death of a spouse or partner. As Kindregan notes, gametes may be cryo-
preserved specifically for use by the surviving spouse or intimate partner of the 
deceased person.8 For example, an individual might receive a diagnosis that may be 
                                                                                                                                                         
6 Ibid.  
7 See e.g. Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c S26, ss 1(1), 47(9); Wills and Succession Act, SA 2010, 
c W 12.2, s 58(2); Intestate Succession Act, CCSM c I85, s 1(3).  
8 Charles P Kindregan, Jr, “Dead Dads: Thawing an Heir From the Freezer” (2009) 35 Wm Mitchell L 
Rev 433 at 436.  
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terminal, and may choose to cryopreserve his or her gametes for future use by a 
surviving spouse or partner.9 In other circumstances, a person involved in high-
risk behaviour, such as a member of the armed forces, might choose to cryo-
preserve his or her gametes.10 Situations may also arise where a person dies 
unexpectedly, and his or her gametes become available even though there was no 
specific consent from the deceased person. As Kindregan suggests, these are com-
plex cases, which pose “legally troublesome” questions.11 
Complex questions, such as those that arise within the context of posthumously 
conceived children, involve many different competing interests. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts outlined three important interests that stand to be 
affected when determining whether or not posthumously conceived children can 
inherit under an intestacy.12 In Woodward v Commissioner of Social Security, the 
court suggested that this determination should “balance and harmonize” the best 
interests of the child, the orderly administration of estates, and the reproductive 
rights of the genetic parents.13 
III. The Current Law and Context in Canada  
Although there has been debate on the issue of posthumously conceived chil-
dren and the possibility of expanding succession rights to such children, there has 
been much less in the way of legislative action in Canada. In 1985, the Ontario Law 
Reform Commission issued a report that highlighted the need for legislation re-
garding the rights of posthumously conceived children. Despite this report and 
others calling for legislative action, assisted reproductive technology was not feder-
ally regulated in Canada until the enactment of the Assisted Human Reproduction 
Act in 2004.14 This federal statute, however, is silent with respect to the rights of 
posthumously conceived children, as succession law falls within provincial jurisdic-
tion.  
One provincial legislature has taken steps to establish rights for posthumously 
conceived children through legislative reform. In 2011, British Columbia became 
the first province to enact legislation that grants posthumously conceived children 
the right to inherit on intestacy.15 Although not yet in force, amendments to the 
Wills, Estates and Succession Act demonstrate a thoughtful balancing of the com-
peting interests that are at stake and provides an example for other provinces and 
territories to follow. This paper will now examine the current domestic law and 
context in order to highlight the desirability of reform to keep pace with technolog-
ical advancements that have impacted, and will continue to impact, the laws of 
succession across the country. 
                                                                                                                                                         
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid. See also Krisine S Knaplund, “Postmortem Conception and a Father’s Last Will” (2004) 46 Ariz L 
Rev 91.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Woodward, supra note 2 at 546.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Howard S Black & Jodey Therriault, “Future Estate Planning Considerations: Cryo-Preservation, 
Cryonics and Cord Blood” (2001) 30 ETPJ 151 at 151.  
15 Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25.  
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(i)  Federal Legislation – The Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
In 2004, the federal government enacted the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
(AHRA)16 which regulates assisted human reproduction, with the primary goals of 
protecting and promoting the health and safety of Canadians who use, or are born 
through the use of, assisted reproduction. With respect to posthumous conception, 
the consent requirements under the AHRA are of importance. Section 8 of the 
AHRA provides that written consent must be given for the use of human reproduc-
tive material:  
8.  (1) No person shall make use of human reproductive material for the 
purpose of creating an embryo unless the donor of the material has giv-
en written consent, in accordance with the regulations, to its use for that 
purpose. 
 (2) No person shall remove human reproductive material from a 
donor’s body after the donor’s death for the purpose of creating an em-
bryo unless the donor of the material has given written consent, in 
accordance with the regulations, to its removal for that purpose. 
 (3) No person shall make use of an in vitro embryo for any purpose 
unless the donor has given written consent, in accordance with the regu-
lations, to its use for that purpose.17 
The federal regulations require that the written consent be given prior to the use of 
the human reproductive material.18 In a recent decision, the constitutionality of the 
AHRA came under fire. In Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, the Su-
preme Court of Canada struck down a number of the provisions of the AHRA.19 
The majority of the Court, however, held that the consent requirements were con-
stitutional, as it fell within the scope of the federal criminal law power.20 As will be 
discussed below, any legislative reform should conform to the consent require-
ments under the AHRA.  
(ii)  Provincial Legislation  
In 2010, the British Columbia government issued a White Paper that dealt with 
proposed amendments to the province’s family law legislation, which includes 
changes to succession legislation.21 A year later, the provincial government enacted 
amendments to the Wills, Estates and Succession Act (WESA)22 that will provide 
                                                                                                                                                         
16 SC 2004, c 2.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Assisted Human Reproduction (Section 8 Consent) Regulations, SOR/2007-137, s 3.  
19 Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61.  
20 Ibid at para 90.  
21 Ministry of the Attorney General – British Columbia, White Paper on Family Relations Act Reform: 
Proposals for a New Family Law Act (Victoria, BC: British Columbia Ministry of Attorney General, 
2010) [White Paper]. 
22 Bill 4, Wills, Estates and Succession Act, 4th Sess, 39th Parl, 2009 (assented to 29 October 2009), SBC 
2009, c 13 (not yet in force).  
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succession rights for posthumously conceived children, with certain conditions.23 
The majority of Bill 16 – Family Law Act24 came into force in March 2013 and 
amended the WESA to include the following provisions: 
8.1  (1) A descendant of a deceased person, conceived and born after the 
person’s death, inherits as if the descendant had been born in the life-
time of the deceased person and had survived the deceased person if all 
of the following conditions apply: 
 (a) a person who was married to, or in a marriage-like relationship 
with, the deceased person when that person died gives written notice, 
within 180 days from the issue of a representation grant, to the deceased 
person’s personal representative, beneficiaries and intestate successors 
that the person may use the human reproductive material of the de-
ceased person to conceive a child through assisted reproduction; 
 (b) the descendant is born within 2 years after the deceased person’s 
death and lives for at least 5 days; 
 (c) the deceased person is the descendant’s parent under Part 3 of 
the Family Law Act. 
 (2) The right of a descendant described in subsection (1) to inherit 
from the relatives of a deceased person begins on the date the descend-
ant is born. 
 (3) Despite subsection (1) (b), a court may extend the time set out in 
that subsection if the court is satisfied that the order would be appropri-
ate on consideration of all relevant circumstances. 
Section 8.1(2) limits a posthumously conceived child’s right to inherit from other 
relatives who may die intestate to the date when the posthumously conceived child 
is born. While a posthumously conceived child can inherit from their parent after 
their death, the same child does not have a claim against a relative who died intes-
tate before their birth.  
With the exception of British Columbia, succession legislation across Canada 
does not currently provide legal rights for posthumously conceived children to 
inherit on intestacy.25 Legislative provisions establish succession rights for children 
who are conceived before, but born after, the death of a parent. For example, in 
Alberta, the Wills and Succession Act provides that any reference to “a ‘child’, to a 
‘descendant’ or to ‘kindred’ includes any child who is in the womb at the time of 
the deceased’s death and is later born alive.”26 Similarly, in Nova Scotia, the Intes-
tate Succession Act does not define a child; however, the legislation provides that a 
child who is en ventre sa mere at the time of a parent’s death is entitled to inherit on 
                                                                                                                                                         
23 White Paper, supra note 21 at 33.  
24 Bill 16, Family Law Act, 4th Sess, 39th Parl, BC, 2011 (assented to 24 November 2011), SBC 2011, c 25. 
25 See e.g. Wills and Succession Act, SA 2010, c W-12.2; Intestate Succession Act, CCSM c I85; Succession 
Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c S26; Intestate Succession Act, RSNS 1989, c 236.  
26 Wills and Succession Act, SA 2010, c W-12.2, s 58(2).  
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intestacy. Section 12 of Nova Scotia’s legislation states the following: “Descendants 
and relatives of the intestate, begotten before the intestate’s death but born thereaf-
ter, shall inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the intestate and had 
survived the intestate.”27 In Ontario, the Succession Law Reform Act (SLRA)28 de-
fines “child” as including “a child conceived before and born alive after the parent’s 
death.”29 The SLRA further defines “issue” as including “a descendant conceived 
before and born alive after the person’s death.”30 Pursuant to the legislation, when a 
person dies intestate, it is the decedent’s spouse, children and issue who are eligible 
to inherit.31 
As Burns suggests, there are two elements to the definition of child and issue in 
the SLRA, both of which need explanation in the context of assisted reproduction.32 
First, there is a linear genetic connection; and second, there is the element of con-
ception.33 It is the second element, conception, which is of particular importance 
for posthumously conceived children. As mentioned above, if a child is conceived 
while a parent is alive and is en ventre sa mere at the time of the parent’s death, the 
legislation provides that a child in such circumstances is considered a child for the 
purposes of legislation, and is eligible to inherit from their parent’s estate on intes-
tacy. The SLRA, however, is silent as to whether posthumously conceived children 
are considered children and therefore also eligible to inherit on intestacy. While the 
courts in Canada have yet to interpret the legislation in this context, provincial 
legislatures may consider providing protections for such children, so long as cer-
tain prescribed conditions are met, as will be discussed below. Such reforms will 
serve to protect the rights of posthumously conceived children and, at the same 
time, balance other competing interests.  
(iii)  Provincial Law Reform Commissions  
Almost three decades ago, the Ontario Law Reform Commission (OLRC) is-
sued a report that highlighted the need for legislative action to address the issues 
concerning posthumously conceived children and succession.34 In its report, the 
Commission recommended that a posthumously conceived child with the “sperm 
of the mother’s husband or partner… should be entitled to inheritance rights in 
respect of any undistributed estate once the child is born or is en ventre sa mere, as 
if the child were conceived while the husband or partner was alive…”35  
Although the Commission was in favour of granting inheritance rights to post-
humously conceived children on intestacy, the Commission was also aware of the 
                                                                                                                                                         
27 Intestate Succession Act, RSNS 1989, c 236, s 12.  
28 RSO 1990, c S26.  
29 Ibid, s 1.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid, s 47. 
32 Clare Burns, “Mission Impossible: Estate Planning and Assisted Human Reproduction” (Paper deliv-
ered at the 2010 Canadian Bar Association National Conference, 16 August 2010) [unpublished] at 9.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Human Artificial Reproduction and Related Matters, vol 
2 (Toronto, Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1985).  
35 Ibid at 278. It appears through its recommendations that the Commission did not consider the possi-
bility that posthumously conceived children could be conceived using the frozen gametes from a 
deceased woman through surrogacy.  
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competing interests and considerations that must be balanced. The Report suggest-
ed that in certain situations, the application of this principle would be 
“impracticable, or unacceptably disruptive where the estate has already been dis-
tributed according to … the laws of intestate succession … Distributions made 
should not be disturbed … distribution should not be postponed simply because 
[gametic material] is held in cryopreservation.”36 Although the OLRC Report was 
not adopted by the legislature, academic commentators and other law reform 
commissions across the country have considered many of the recommendations in 
the Report.37 
In 2008, the Manitoba Law Reform Commission released a report on posthu-
mously conceived children and intestate succession.38 Among other things, the 
Report recommended that Manitoba’s provincial legislation governing succession 
law be amended to provide certain rights to posthumously conceived children. 
Manitoba’s Intestate Succession Act (ISA) defines “issue” as “all lineal descendants 
of a person through all generations.”39 A posthumously conceived child, being bio-
logically related to the person, may appear to qualify as a “lineal descendant,” 
however, the Act further qualifies this by stating that “kindred of the intestate con-
ceived before and born alive after the death of the intestate inherit as if they had 
been born in the lifetime of the intestate.”40 The ISA is silent as to whether children 
conceived and born after the death of a parent are considered to be issue within the 
meaning of the legislation.41  
The Report recommended that the ISA be amended to include succession rights 
for posthumously conceived children to inherit on intestacy, subject to four condi-
tions.42 First, any posthumously conceived children must be conceived within two 
years of the grant of administration of the estate.43 Second, the potential user of the 
genetic material must provide notice in writing within six months of the grant of 
administration of the estate to the administrator of the estate and to any person 
whose interest in the estate may be affected.44 Third, there must be proof of a bio-
logical link between the posthumously conceived child and the deceased parent.45 
Finally, there must be consent in writing signed by the deceased person to the use 
of the gametic material for the purpose of posthumous conception and to the fu-
ture inheritance rights of any resulting children.46 Despite the Law Reform 
Commission’s Report urging legislative action to address this issue, Manitoba’s 
government has yet to incorporate the Report’s recommendations into legislation.  
                                                                                                                                                         
36 Ibid at 182.  
37 Black and Therriault, supra note 14 at 157.  
38 Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Posthumously Conceived Children: Intestate Succession and De-
pendants Relief: The Intestate Succession Act: sections 1(3), 6(1), 4(5), 4(6) and 5, (Winnipeg: Manitoba 
Law Reform Commission, 2008).  
39 Intestate Succession Act, CCSM c I85 at 1(1).  
40 Ibid, s 1(3).  
41 Manitoba Law Reform Commission, supra note 38 at 4.  
42 Ibid at 24.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid.  
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A preliminary discussion of expanding rights for posthumously conceived chil-
dren has now begun in Alberta. In January 2012, the Alberta Law Reform Institute 
released a Report for Discussion, entitled “Succession and Posthumously Con-
ceived Children.”47 While the Report does not propose specific recommendations, 
it raises some of the issues that concern posthumously conceived children, includ-
ing whether these children should be eligible to inherit from their deceased parent 
on intestacy. Further, the Report presents some of the possible considerations for 
reform, including amendments to the current legislation in Alberta.  
IV. Succession Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children –  
International Perspectives 
While British Columbia has enacted provincial legislation that addresses the 
succession rights of posthumously conceived children on intestacy, many provinc-
es and territories across the country have yet to consider possible reforms. It is 
useful, in this regard, to examine international examples of legislative efforts and 
jurisprudence, which can provide additional guidance for provincial legislatures 
and courts in considering the succession rights of posthumously conceived chil-
dren to inherit on intestacy. The United States has begun to address these issues, 
through both jurisprudence and state legislation. Moreover, Australia and the 
United Kingdom have also examined the rights of posthumously conceived chil-
dren to varying degrees. This paper will now turn to an examination of 
jurisprudence from the United States on the issue of the succession rights of post-
humously conceived children.  
(i) Jurisprudence48  
Courts in Canada have not yet had the opportunity to address whether post-
humously conceived children have the right to inherit under intestacy. Many of the 
cases arising in the United States provide a thoughtful analysis of the competing 
interests that must be balanced in cases involving the rights of posthumously con-
ceived children. At the same time, these cases also acknowledge the underlying 
public policy issues that are at stake and many courts have urged state legislatures 
to take on the complex task of balancing these concerns through the enactment of 
legislation.  
While the majority of cases that have been decided in the United States have fo-
cused on the rights of posthumously conceived children to access benefits, such as 
social security survivor benefits, the following cases hinged on whether or not a 
posthumously conceived child can inherit on intestacy pursuant to state intestacy 
law. Under the federal Social Security Act (SSA), a child is entitled to receive bene-
fits provided that the parent was fully insured, the child is under the age of 18 and 
                                                                                                                                                         
47 Alberta Law Reform Institute, supra note 3. 
48 For a more comprehensive examination of American jurisprudence on the issue of posthumously 
conceived children, see Jamie Rowsell, “Stayin’ Alive: Postmortem Reproduction and Inheritance 
Rights” (2003) 41:3 Fam Ct Rev 400. See also Michael K. Elliott, “Tales of Parenthood from the Crypt: 
The Predicament of the Posthumously Conceived Child” (2004) 39 Real Prop Prob & Tr J 47.  
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unmarried, and the child was dependent on the individual at the time of death.49 
The SSA defines a child as “the child or legally adopted child of an individual.”50 
The legislation provides for the determination that a child may be deemed a child 
under the SSA if, among other things, that child would be eligible to inherit on in-
testacy pursuant to state legislation.51 If the status of a potential child is in dispute, 
as may well be the case with a posthumously conceived child, the Social Security 
Administration as well as the courts, look to state intestacy legislation to determine 
whether a posthumously conceived child can be considered a “child” pursuant to 
the SSA.  
In one of the first cases to consider the legal status and rights of posthumously 
conceived children, the New Jersey Superior Court examined whether 18-month 
old twins, who were posthumously conceived, were eligible to receive social securi-
ty benefits.52 In Estate of William Kolacy, the husband was diagnosed with cancer. 
Prior to undergoing chemotherapy, the husband deposited sperm into a sperm 
bank, in the event that such treatment rendered him sterile. Almost a year after his 
death, his widow underwent in-vitro fertilization and conceived twin girls who 
were born eighteen months after his death. In this case, the court examined New 
Jersey’s intestacy legislation and held that, given the general legislative intent of the 
statute to give preference to children, the children should be deemed the legal heirs 
of Mr. Kolacy.53 As Lewis suggests, the court in this case concluded that the statue 
must be interpreted broadly, so as to give a posthumously conceived child the 
chance to inherit from a decedent’s estate.54  
The court emphasized the fact that the state legislation failed to address the is-
sues raised in this case. The court urged the legislature to take action.55 Given the 
unpredictable nature of the legislative process, however, the court was not willing 
to take a wait-and-see approach:  
The State has urged that courts should not entertain actions such as the 
present one, but should wait until the Legislature has dealt with the 
kinds of issues presented by this case. As indicated above, I think it 
would be helpful for the Legislature to deal with these kinds of issues. In 
the meanwhile, life goes on, and people come into the courts seeking re-
dress for present problems. We judges cannot simply put those 
problems on hold in the hope that some day (which may never come) 
the Legislature will deal with the problem in question. Simple justice re-
                                                                                                                                                         
49 Social Security Act, 42 USC § 402(d)(1); See also Charles P Kindregan, Jr & Maureen McBrien, Assist-
ed Reproductive Technology: A Lawyer’s Guide to Emerging Law and Science, 2d ed (Chicago, American 
Bar Association, 2011) at 267.  
50 Social Security Act, ibid at § 416(e)(1). 
51 Ibid at § 416(h)(2). In cases of a deceased individual, the state from which the legislation is to be con-
sidered is “the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death.” 
52 In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A 2d 1257 (NJ Super Ct 2000) [Kolacy].  
53 Ibid at 1262.  
54 Browne C Lewis, “Dead Men Reproducing: Responding to the Existence of Afterdeath Children” 
(2008-2009) 16 Geo Mason L Rev 403 at 414.  
55 Ibid.  
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quires us to do the best we can with the statutory law which is presently 
available.56 
While the result in this case was a declaration that the children were the legal 
heirs of Mr. Kolacy, the court noted that this would not always be an appropriate 
remedy. The court emphasized the competing interests that arise in cases of post-
humously conceived children and noted that granting the legal status of heir may 
not always be appropriate, particularly when doing so would “unfairly intrude on 
the rights of other persons or would cause serious problems in terms of the orderly 
administration of estates.”57 The court opined, however, that this issue could be 
addressed through the imposition of time limits through enacting legislation, not-
ing that “it would undoubtedly be both fair and constitutional for a Legislature to 
impose time limits and other situationally described limits on the ability of after 
born children to take from or through a parent.”58 
In Woodward v Commissioner of Social Security Administration,59 the appellant, 
Lauren Woodward, conceived twins through artificial insemination after the death 
of her husband, using his frozen sperm. The mother sought to access Social Securi-
ty survivor benefits on behalf of herself and her two daughters. After the mother’s 
application was denied, she appealed in the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts. The federal court then certified the issue to the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, who was tasked with determining whether or not 
posthumously conceived children could inherit under Massachusetts’ intestacy 
legislation. 
The court held that in “certain limited circumstances,” a posthumously con-
ceived child “may enjoy the inheritance rights of ‘issue’” under Massachusetts’ 
intestacy legislation.60 As noted above, the court in this case held that determining 
whether posthumously conceived children can inherit on intestacy implicates three 
important state interests: the best interests of the child, the orderly administration 
of estates, and the reproductive rights of the genetic parent.61 In its discussion of 
the best interests of the child, the court held that “the protection of minor chil-
dren…has been a hallmark of legislative action and jurisprudence of [the] court.”62 
The court also noted that assisted reproductive technologies that make post-
humous conception possible have been in existence for several years. The court 
went further and stated that despite the existence of these technologies, the legisla-
ture “has not acted to narrow the broad statutory class of posthumous children to 
restrict posthumously conceived children from taking in intestacy.”63 Furthermore, 
the court argued, the legislature “has in great measure affirmatively supported the 
assistive reproductive technologies that are the only means by which these children 
can come into being.”64 As a result of the legislature’s failure to act on this issue, the 
                                                                                                                                                         
56 Ibid at 1261-1262.  
57 Ibid at 1262.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Woodward, supra note 2. 
60 Ibid at 259.  
61 Ibid at 265.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid.  
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court assumed that the legislature “intended that such children be ‘entitled,’ in so 
far as possible, ‘to the same rights and protections of the law’ as children conceived 
before death.”65 
While the decision in Woodward favoured the rights of the posthumously con-
ceived children, the court acknowledged the limitations of the court process and, 
similar to the court in Kolacy, stressed the need for legislative action. As the court 
noted,  
[t]he questions present in this case cry out for lengthy, careful examina-
tion outside the adversary process, which can only address the specific 
circumstances of each controversy that presents itself. They demand a 
comprehensive response reflecting the considered will of the people.66  
Although some courts have recognized the rights of posthumously conceived 
children to inherit on intestacy, this recognition has not been universal across the 
United States.67 In Finley v Astrue,68 the Arkansas Supreme Court also considered 
the rights of posthumously conceived children to inherit on intestacy. The facts of 
the case were as follows69: Amy and Wade Finley were married in 1990. During the 
course of their marriage, the Finleys participated in an in vitro fertilization and 
embryo transfer program. In 2001, Mr. Finley died intestate. Less than one year 
later, Ms. Finley conceived a child using the previously frozen embryos. Ms. Finley 
applied for Social Security benefits on behalf of the child, however her application 
was denied. She appealed the decision to the United States District Court, who 
once again certified the question of state law as to whether a posthumously con-
ceived child was eligible to inherit under Arkansas intestacy law.70  
The Supreme Court of Arkansas examined the state intestacy legislation and 
determined that the statute precludes posthumously conceived children from in-
heriting on intestacy.71 The statute stipulates that posthumous descendants must be 
conceived before the decedent’s death.72 As the statute does not provide a defini-
tion of conceived, Ms. Finley argued that conception occurred when the embryo 
was created, which took place while Mr. Finley was alive.73 The court, however, 
rejected this argument. 
While some courts have taken the approach of bridging a legislative gap, the 
court in Finley took the opposite approach and looked solely to the legislative in-
tent: 
We can definitively say that the General Assembly… did not intend for 
the statute to permit a child, created through in vitro fertilization and 
                                                                                                                                                         
65 Ibid at 266.  
66 Ibid at 272.  
67 See Eng Khabbaz v Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 930 A 2d 1180 (NH Sup Ct 2007); 
Finley v Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 270 SW 3d 849 (Ark Sup Ct 2008). 
68 Ibid, Finley v Astrue. 
69 Ibid at 850-851.  
70 Ibid at 850.  
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid at 853. See Ark Code Ann §28-9-210(a) (2004).  
73 Ibid at 851.  
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implanted after the father’s death, to inherit under intestate succession. 
Not only does the instant statute fail to specifically address such a sce-
nario, but it was enacted in 1969, which was well before the technology 
of in vitro fertilization was developed.74 
The court refused to define conception, stating that the role of the court “is not to 
create the law, but to interpret the law and to give effect to the legislature’s in-
tent.”75 Further, the court noted that defining conception would lead the court into 
the role of policy-maker:  
Were we to define the term “conceive,” we would be making a determi-
nation that would implicate many public policy concerns, including, but 
certainly not limited to, the finality of estates. That is not our role. The 
determination of public policy lies almost exclusively with the legisla-
ture, and we will not interfere with that determination in the absence of 
palpable errors.76 
While the court in this case refused to recognize the rights of posthumously con-
ceived children to inherit on intestacy, the court concluded by urging the state 
legislature to address “the issues involved in the instant case and those that have 
not but will likely evolve.”77  
The issues arising from the foregoing cases went before the United States Su-
preme Court in 2012. In Astrue v Capato,78 the mother sought Social Security 
survivor benefits on behalf of her posthumously conceived children. The lower 
court decision outlines the facts of the case.79 Shortly after they were married, Mr. 
Capato was diagnosed with cancer. Before commencing chemotherapy treatments, 
Mr. Capato had his sperm frozen. Although the Capatos conceived naturally dur-
ing the course of his treatment, the couple wanted another child. Mr. Capato died 
in 2002 in Florida. Three months before he died, Mr. Capato executed a will that 
named his living son and two children from a previous marriage as beneficiaries. 
Although Mrs. Capato claims that she and her husband spoke to the lawyer about 
including “unborn children” in his will, there was no such provision. Six months 
after Mr. Capato’s death, Mrs. Capato conceived through in vitro fertilization and 
eighteen months after his death, she gave birth to twins.  
Mrs. Capato applied for social security benefits on behalf of her twins, however 
her application was denied. The Social Security Administration’s decision was up-
held by the District Court, and Mrs. Capato appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit. In reversing the lower court’s decision, the Court of 
Appeals held that the children came within the definition of children under the 
Social Security Act.80 
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75 Ibid.  
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77 Ibid.  
78 Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security v Capato, 132 S Ct 2021, 182 L Ed 2d 887 (2012) [Capato].  
79 Capato v Commissioner of Social Security, 631 F 3d 626 at 627-628 (Cir 2011).  
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In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Court 
of Appeals’ decision and held that a posthumously conceived child cannot rely 
solely on a genetic connection between the child and the deceased person.81 The 
Court held that the posthumously conceived child must demonstrate that he or she 
would have been eligible to inherit under the state’s succession legislation. In 
reaching its decision, the Court looked at the intent of the social security legisla-
tion: 
The paths to receipt of benefits under the Act and regulations, we must 
not forget, proceed from Congress’ perception of the core purpose of the 
legislation. The aim was not to create a program “generally benefiting 
needy persons”; it was, more particularly, to “provide…dependent 
members of [a wage earners] family with protection against the hardship 
occasioned by [the] loss of [the insured’s] earnings.82  
The Court held that the determination of whether a child is entitled to social secu-
rity benefits must be made by determining whether he or she would be entitled to 
inherit under state intestacy legislation. In this case, Florida’s law prohibits post-
humously conceived children from inheriting, unless specifically provided for in 
the deceased’s will. Ultimately, the Court held that the Social Security Administra-
tion’s interpretation of the law was reasonable, and therefore its decision was 
entitled to deference.83  
(ii) Legislation  
United States  
While the majority of states do not deal specifically with posthumously con-
ceived children, twelve states currently have enacted some form of legislation that, 
to some degree, defines the rights of posthumously conceived children to inherit 
on intestacy.84 California’s legislation is the most comprehensive scheme dealing 
with the implications of posthumous conception and the rights of resulting chil-
dren.85 The provisions contemplate and address many of the policy concerns that 
arise in situations involving posthumous conception. Further, the legislation pro-
vides a balanced approach to harmonizing these concerns, including the best 
interests of the child, the orderly administration of estates, and the reproductive 
rights of the genetic parent. Under California law, a posthumously conceived child 
is considered to have been born during the lifetime of the decedent if certain condi-
tions are met.86 First, the statute requires that the decedent consent to the use of his 
or her gametic material for posthumous reproduction, and must designate a person 
to be in control of said material.87 Second, the person designated by the decedent to 
                                                                                                                                                         
81 Capato, supra note 78. 
82 Ibid at 2032.  
83 Ibid at 2033.  
84 Kindregan & McBrien, supra note 49 at 266. These states include: California, Louisiana, Florida, Vir-
ginia, Colorado, Delaware, New Mexico, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.  
85 Kindregan, supra note 8 at 443.  
86 Cal Prob Code § 249.5 (2010).  
87 Ibid at § 249.5(a).  
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control the gametic material must notify the estate within four months of the dece-
dent’s death that said material is available for use.88 Finally, the child must be 
conceived within two years of the decedent’s death.89 As Kindregan suggests, the 
California statute can serve as an appropriate model and approach for other states 
to follow.90  
Not all states that have enacted legislation permit posthumously conceived 
children to inherit on intestacy.91 Florida’s statute, for example, requires that a 
written agreement be executed between the couple intending to posthumously 
conceive and their physician, which outlines what is to happen to the gametes 
and/or embryos upon the death of a spouse.92 Further, the statute provides that 
even if the couple consents to posthumous reproduction, a resulting child “shall 
not be eligible for a claim against the decedent’s estate unless the child has been 
provided for by the decedent’s will.”93 Therefore, a posthumously conceived child 
would be prohibited from inheriting on intestacy.  
United Kingdom  
In 1984, the Department of Health and Social Security commissioned a report 
on the question of whether succession rights should be expanded to protect post-
humously conceived children.94 The Report recommended that posthumous 
conception should be “actively discouraged.”95 The Report acknowledged the un-
derlying policy concern of finality and orderly administration of an estate, and 
suggested that posthumously conceived children could “cause real problems of 
inheritance and succession.”96 Finally, the Report recommended that the govern-
ment introduce legislation to discourage posthumous conception that would 
exclude posthumously conceived children from any succession rights. The Report 
recommended that this legislation should provide “that any child born by [artificial 
insemination by husband] who was not in utero at the date of the death of its father 
shall be disregarded for the purposes of succession to and inheritance from the 
latter.”97 
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Until recently, the legislation prohibited any recognition of a posthumously 
conceived child as a child of his or her father. The Human Fertilisation and Embry-
ology Act 1990 (HFEA) stated that “where…the sperm of a man, or any embryo the 
creation of which was brought about with his sperm, was used after his death, he is 
not to be treated as the father of the child.”98 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Act 2003 amended 
the HFEA to permit the declaration of such a man as the father of the child for the 
purposes of birth registration only.99 Thus, posthumously conceived children are 
still prohibited from inheriting from their father’s intestacy.100 As the statute is fo-
cused specifically on the use of a man’s sperm, it is unclear if the drafters of the 
legislation contemplated the use of a deceased woman’s frozen gametes in posthu-
mous conception.  
Australia  
In 2007, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission considered whether 
posthumously conceived children should be granted succession rights.101 The 
Commission was tasked with examining the current law and drafting a model law 
on succession.102 The Commission concluded there were three options for dealing 
with “the problem of children born more than 10 months after the death of the 
intestate.”103 First, there could be no express recognition of posthumously con-
ceived children, which would leave judges to deal with the issue on an ad hoc 
basis.104 Second, there would be no provision other than to provide for an “ultimate 
limit of a fixed period after the death of the intestate, for example, one or two 
years.”105 The final option considered by the Commission would be to disregard 
posthumously conceived children from inheriting on intestacy.106  
While the Commission acknowledged the deficiencies in the current legislative 
scheme, given the advancements in assisted reproductive technologies, the Com-
mission ultimately recommended the final option and suggested that “the simplest 
answer is to exclude [posthumously conceived children], by requiring them to be 
in the uterus at the intestate’s death.”107 The Commission reasoned that granting 
inheritance rights to posthumously conceived children would lead to “delays and 
complexity in the administration of a deceased estate, especially when a number of 
people in a generation have to be determined for the purposes of per stirpes distri-
bution.”108 The Commission’s draft legislation would prohibit posthumously 
conceived children from inheriting on intestacy: 
                                                                                                                                                         
98 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK), c 37, s 28(6). 
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9 – General limitation of non-spousal entitlements  
(1)  A person is not entitled to participate in the distribution of an intes-
tate estate unless 
(a)  born before the intestate’s death; or 
(b)  born after a period of gestation in the uterus that commenced before 
the intestate’s death.109 
As noted from the above discussion, many jurisdictions have taken on the task 
of addressing the issue of whether posthumously conceived children can inherit on 
intestacy. The results have varied from granting succession rights to posthumously 
conceived children, to an outright exclusion of these children from the distribution 
of a deceased person’s estate on intestacy.  
V. Considerations for Reform 
Drawing from examples from other jurisdictions, this paper will now turn to 
possible considerations for reform. In order to bring succession legislation in line 
with advancements in reproductive technologies, consideration may be given to 
recognizing posthumously conceived children and granting succession rights to 
such children to inherit on intestacy. Any amendments, however, should be subject 
to certain conditions. The best interests of posthumously conceived children, the 
orderly administration of estates, the interests of other beneficiaries, and the re-
productive rights of the genetic parent need to be effectively balanced. In doing so, 
many of the public policy concerns that arise in situations involving posthumous 
conception can be addressed.  
As reproductive technology continues to develop, other jurisdictions have be-
gun to address the rights of posthumously conceived children. By drawing from 
some of these examples, such as the model set out in California’s statute, British 
Columbia’s recent amendments to the Family Law Act, and the recommendations 
in the Manitoba Law Reform Commission Report, it is possible for provinces 
across Canada to consider clarifying the rights of posthumously conceived children 
and establish certain requirements in order for them to be recognized as children 
and granted succession rights on intestacy. First, the deceased person must con-
sent, in writing, to the posthumous use of his or her genetic material. This would 
protect the reproductive rights of the deceased person, and would ensure there was 
consent to the posthumous conception and to support any resulting child. Second, 
notice should be given to the administrator of the estate, which would permit freez-
ing the administration of an intestacy on behalf of the posthumously conceived 
child. Third, a limitation period would establish a timeframe within which a child 
must be conceived. This time limit would need to take into account the interests of 
other potential beneficiaries under the intestacy, while at the same time it would 
need to acknowledge the grief a surviving spouse or partner might experience and 
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the complexities and potential hurdles involved in undergoing assisted reproduc-
tive procedures.110 Finally, a genetic link would be required in order for the child to 
be granted inheritance rights. 
VI. The Parens Patriae Jurisdiction  
While there has been a growing discussion across the country with respect to 
posthumously conceived children, current legislation does not address the issues. If 
the issue of whether a posthumously conceived child can inherit on intestacy 
should come before the courts, the use of the courts’ parens patriae jurisdiction to 
fill this legislative gap may be appropriate. As Wilson notes, the parens patriae ju-
risdiction is “[s]aid to be the sovereign power which has been vested in the 
provincial superior courts throughout Canada, its raison d’être was and remains 
the necessity within the law for a remedial failsafe for those who are unable to care 
for themselves.”111 
There is arguably a legislative gap in succession legislation across the country 
that does not currently provide legal rights and protections to posthumously con-
ceived children. An examination of the application of the parens patriae 
jurisdiction in other contexts provides some support for the extension of this juris-
diction to establish rights for posthumously conceived children to inherit on 
intestacy.  
In E (Mrs) v Eve, the Supreme Court of Canada commented on the nature and 
scope of the inherent parens patriae jurisdiction of provincial superior courts: 
From the earliest time, the sovereign, as parens patriae, was vested with 
the care of the mentally incompetent. This right and duty, as Lord Eldon 
noted in Wellesley v Duke of Beaufort…is founded on the obvious neces-
sity that the law should place somewhere the care of persons who are not 
able to take care of themselves. In early England, the parens patriae ju-
risdiction was confined to mental incompetents, but its rationale is 
obviously applicable to children and, following the transfer of that juris-
diction to the Lord Chancellor in the seventeenth century, he extended it 
to children under wardship, and it is in this context that the bulk of the 
modern cases on the subject arise. The parens patriae jurisdiction was 
later vested in the provincial superior courts of this country, and in par-
ticular, those of Prince Edward Island.112 
The Court held that the parens patriae jurisdiction is founded on the principle of 
protecting those who cannot care for themselves; it is to be exercised for the benefit 
of that person, not for the benefit of others.113 
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The jurisprudence indicates that the parens patriae jurisdiction can be used to 
rescue a child in danger, or fill a legislative gap.114 Courts have held, however, that 
this jurisdiction must be exercised with caution and restraint. As Justice LaForest 
held in Eve, supra, while the scope of the parens patriae jurisdiction may be unlim-
ited, it does not follow that the discretion to exercise such jurisdiction is also 
without limits.115 The jurisdiction must be exercised in accordance with the under-
lying principle: 
Simply put, the discretion is to do what is necessary for the protection of 
the person for whose benefit it is exercised…The discretion is to be ex-
ercised for the benefit of that person, not for that of others. It is a 
discretion, too, that must at all times be exercised with great caution, a 
caution that must be redoubled as the seriousness of the matter increas-
es. This is particularly so in cases where a court might be tempted to act 
because failure to do so would risk imposing an obviously heavy burden 
on some other individual.116 
In Lennox and Addington Family and Children’s Services v TS117 the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice was tasked with determining whether the child protection 
matter could be transferred to the jurisdiction of Iceland’s child protection agency. 
In determining that the court was unable to invoke its parens patriae jurisdiction in 
such a case, Justice Robertson made the following comments with respect to filling 
a legislative gap: “the court is unable to repair any legislative shortcoming through 
parens patriae. As a court of superior jurisdiction, parens patriae authorizes the 
court through its inherent jurisdiction to intervene and rescue a child in danger. It 
can sometimes be used to bridge a legislative gap. It does not confer supplemental 
jurisdiction so as to rewrite legislation and procedure.”118 
While courts have held that the parens patriae jurisdiction can be used to fill a 
legislative gap, it must be used with restraint and courts must not “over-reach” in 
determining whether or not such a gap exists.119 Courts must examine the legisla-
tive intent in order to determine whether the gap was intentional or part of a larger 
legislative scheme.120 In MDR v Ontario (Deputy Registrar General), an application 
was brought by two lesbian parents who sought to include the particulars of both 
parents on each child’s Statement of Live Birth. The applicants’ children were con-
ceived using assisted reproductive technology with sperm from an anonymous 
donor. The applicants argued that they were entitled to registration of both par-
ents’ particulars under the Vital Statistics Act and a declaration of parentage 
pursuant to the Children’s Law Reform Act. In the alternative, the applicants argued 
that the court ought to use its parens patriae jurisdiction to fill the legislative gap to 
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protect the best interests of the children in this case. In determining that there were 
alternative mechanisms available, the court looked at the legislature’s intent and 
the larger, comprehensive scheme for registration and recognition of parentage. 
The court held that no gap existed and therefore did not exercise its parens patriae 
jurisdiction. In reaching this decision, Justice Rivard made the following com-
ments:  
In light of this purpose, it is my view that the fact that lesbian co-
mothers are not able to register under the VSA does not appear to be a 
mere gap, but part of a comprehensive scheme for birth registration and 
recognition of parentage. It was the legislature’s intent that their primary 
source of recognition would be through a CLRA declaration or adop-
tion. Like in C.G., the legislature has set out alternate routes through 
which an individual can be found to be a parent. While the alternative 
option is not as favourable to the Applicants, again like in C.G., this does 
not mean that the legislature has not turned its mind to the issue. It has 
determined that it is in the best interests of children to have more diffi-
cult issues of non-biological parentage considered by the courts.121 
The court held that this case was distinguishable from cases in which a legislative 
gap had been found to exist where no alterative recourse was available.122 The court 
emphasized the fact that the legislature had turned its mind to the best interests of 
the child in developing the legislative scheme by providing an alternative mecha-
nism for determining and recognizing parentage.123 
More recently, in AA v BB, the Ontario Court of Appeal applied the parens pa-
triae jurisdiction to fill a legislative gap to permit the declaration of three parents 
under the Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA). The Court of Appeal commented on 
the change in societal norms since the enactment of the legislation:  
Present social conditions and attitudes have changed. Advances in our 
appreciation of the value of other types of relationships and in the sci-
ence of reproductive technology have created gaps in the CLRA’s 
legislative scheme. Because of these changes the parents of a child can be 
two women or two men. They are as much the child’s parents as adopt-
ing parents or “natural” parents. The CLRA, however, does not 
recognize these forms of parenting and thus the children of these rela-
tionships are deprived of the equality of status that declarations of 
parentage provide.124 
The Court found it contrary to the child’s best interests to be deprived of the legal 
recognition of the parentage of one of his mothers.  
The Court in AA v BB emphasized the fact that the legislature could not have 
contemplated such a change in social conditions at the time when the CLRA was 
enacted. As Rosenberg J.A. held:  
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There is no doubt that the legislature did not foresee for the possibility 
of declarations of parentage for two women, but that is a product of the 
social conditions and medical knowledge at the time. The legislature did 
not turn its mind to that possibility, so that over 30 years later the gap in 
the legislation has been revealed.125 
Under the same line of reasoning, it can be argued that provincial legislatures could 
not have contemplated or foreseen such advancements in technology that now 
make it possible to conceive a child after the death of a genetic parent. Further-
more, the courts have held that a legislative gap will not exist for the purpose of 
invoking the parens patriae jurisdiction in circumstances in which there is an al-
ternative mechanism or remedy to obtain the relief sought. In the case of 
posthumously conceived children, however, there is no such alternate form of re-
course. By using this two-pronged approach, it is arguable that establishing 
succession rights for posthumously conceived children to inherit on intestacy 
would be an appropriate exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction.  
VII. Conclusions and Recommendations 
As Berry suggests, “[a]s quickly as courts deal with one issue of new reproduc-
tive technology, a new technology is developed that creates even more complicated 
issues.”126 Assisted reproductive technology continues to develop and advance; 
however, the law has remained static. Recent developments, both in Canada and 
the United States, highlight the need for consideration of these complex issues. As 
discussed above, it is important to protect the rights of posthumously conceived 
children, while at the same time, balance competing interests, including the state, 
and other beneficiaries under the decedent’s estate. Other jurisdictions, both do-
mestic and international, provide examples that harmonize and balance competing 
interests and policy considerations, while at the same time provide succession 
rights to posthumously conceived children to inherit on intestacy.  
As the courts in Kolacy and Woodward urged, it should be the responsibility of 
legislatures, and not the courts, to address the complex policy issues that arise in 
situations involving posthumously conceived children. Courts, however, should 
not take a “wait-and-see” approach. Many provincial legislatures have, so far, not 
had the opportunity to address these issues, and it may be up to the courts to use 
the parens patriae jurisdiction to fill this legislative gap in order to protect posthu-
mously conceived children and their right to inherit on intestacy. Many complex 
issues arise within the context of succession and posthumously conceived children, 
and these are issues that warrant consideration.  
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